Police liaisons as builders of transnational security cooperation by Yon H.
7 Police liaisons as builders 
of transnational security 
cooperation
Hasan Yon
Transnationalization of security services
This section of the volume turns to the specific area of police cooperation as a 
way of understanding the challenges to broader cooperation in intelligence prac-
tices as well as the potential for its success. While Chapter 6 looked at the factors 
underlying successful police cooperation efforts, this chapter focuses on one aspect 
of police cooperation – police liaisons – and explores their role in building up a 
cooperative transnational response to security issues, in particular, terrorism. The 
chapter begins with a discussion of the kinds of initiatives that have been and con-
tinue to be made in the area of security cooperation; a discussion broadly structured 
on the basis of the discussion provided in Chapter 1 of different realms of security 
relations (state- centric and multi- centric) as well as along a traditional dividing of 
actors into two broad types: liberal and realist. Exploring the resulting categories 
and the initiatives that can be grouped accordingly, reveals that the most progres-
sive and arguably effective developments in combating transnational threats have 
been occurring in the realist state and multi- centric domains.
The transnationalization trend in security cooperation 
practices
The liberal/state- centric domain
With respect to security cooperation practices in general, it is possible to cite con-
siderable activity having taken place over the years within the liberal/state- centric 
domain – that is, formal relations or initiatives formulated among state- based 
international organizations or entities (see Figure 7.1, below). Beginning with the 
cooperation efforts of large international organizations (IO), such as the United 
Nations, to those IOs with agendas more specifically focused on security, such as 
INTERPOL or EUROPOL, these organizations have traditionally drawn up con-
ventions agreeing on ways of addressing particular security threats, and created 
regimes of expected norms and behaviors towards those threats.
The deployment of police liaison officers to international organizations also falls 
within the liberal/state- centric domain. This practice involves states appointing 
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officers to work at international organizations of which their country is a mem-
ber, such as French officers appointed to EUROPOL. Variations on this practice 
also occur, such as the employing of liaison officers from non- member states to 
member- based international organizations. Examples of this include the employ-
ment of American FBI, Secret Service and DEA liaison officers to EUROPOL. 
Similarly, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Australia and Colombia also have liaison 
officers in EUROPOL, although they are not EU member countries. We also see 
examples of the reverse: employing liaison officers from international organiza-
tions to non- member states, for example, having officers from EUROPOL posted 
as liaisons in Washington, DC.1 And finally there is increasing practice of liaison 
officers being appointed between international police organizations, as is the case 
with liaison officer exchanges between EUROPOL and INTERPOL.2 All three of 
these trends in liaison officer exchanges by international organizations and non-
 member states have taken place in the post 9/11 era and all with an overt purpose 
of responding to terrorism.
Activity within the liberal/multi- centric domain
It is possible to say that security cooperation practices by and among the existing 
non- governmental groups and organizations of the liberal/multi- centric domain 
are growing, and many new organizations have even emerged in recent years. 
Forms of Cooperative Security Relations
State- Centric Interactions
(Formal relations formulated by 
central state organs)
Multi- Centric Interactions
(Informal relations formulated by a 
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Some early examples of initiatives in this area can be seen in the establishing of 
non- governmental international police organizations, e.g. the International Police 
Association (IPA), the International Association of Women Police (IAWP), the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), and the International Police 
Executive Symposium. These organizations have contributed to the shared under-
standings between police officers around the world in different ways. The IPA, 
for example, is a worldwide police organization, which aims to increase social 
and professional interactions among its members, while the International Police 
Executive Symposium is an academic platform, which organizes conferences to 
discuss specific police problems. All these organizations contribute to the establish-
ment of a discussion ground for members, however, they do not necessarily serve 
the aim of building up transnational security cooperation, since they tend to lack the 
jurisdiction and muscle to enforce wide- reaching security cooperation practices.
A second area of development in this liberal/multi- centric domain can be seen 
in the growth of private entities providing various security services not only to 
private companies but to governments as well. Private security firms have long 
been cooperative partners for states in countering terrorism, but have certain short-
comings made most obvious in the recent example of Blackwater and its activities 
in Iraq. Basically, such private security services are ultimately businesses, and as 
such lack the vision and public service conscience that should be present in a non-
 profit governmental organization or entity. In terms of serving to the promotion 
in particular of cooperation on security matters, these private services have yet to 
offer anything of significance, and may even prove a hindrance.
Another development in this realm is the founding of private organizations that 
provide information and reports to clients – including government, intelligence 
and law- enforcement bodies. Examples include organizations such as IntelCenter 
(www.intelcenter.com) and the Search for International Terrorist Entities (SITE, 
www.siteinstitute.com). The SITE institute’s activities, for example, consist of 
surfing internet web pages and chat rooms to trace terrorist content.3 According 
to the information on the institute’s website, their experts translate four kinds of 
sources: transcripts of terrorist leaders’ speeches, videos and messages; terrorist 
books, magazines, fatwas and training manuals; terrorist communiqués; and ter-
rorist chatter discussing potential targets, methods of attack and other relevant 
material.4 These translations are then provided to the institute’s clients.
In the security realm, and in particular the fight against terrorism, which has 
always been accepted as the domain of the state, this involvement of private 
organizations is an interesting development, and such institutes/entities may be 
able to provide valuable information, but this information may also be controver-
sial. To give an example from the SITE case, a basic search on the internet reveals 
numerous websites raising cautionary calls against Rita Katz, the owner of SITE, 
because of her personal background and the killing of her father by the Saddam 
regime in Iraq. Such allegations inevitably raise questions about the reliability 
of the information her organization provides. In general, these and other non-
 governmental organizations can be criticized as being more likely to be open to 
penetration and manipulation than official state organizations or groups, to possess 
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less organizational capacity, and be prone to less coordination capacity given pos-
sibly very different perceptions and definitions of what constitutes a threat.
Yet another new development in this realm is the strategy of local state or sub-
 state authorities building up transnational capacities on their own, in the sense 
of coordinating with non- governmental entities or individuals. To illustrate, an 
example from the New York police may be useful. The NYPD has in its employ 
an individual of Turkish origin, who serves as a liaison officer between the NYPD 
and the Muslim community in the city.5 I met with this individual after he finished 
up his prayers at the Turkish Fatih Mosque in Brooklyn. During our interview I 
learned how he established links with the New York Police after organizing a 
support rally in response to the disastrous earthquake in Turkey in 1999. He now 
serves as community coordinator, but carries a police ID, and works at Police 
Headquarters directly under the Police Commissioner. During our interview I 
learned that he has also been involved with establishing NYPD liaison offices 
around the world, and described his role in working with them in this way:
Overseas liaison officers have my name in their phone books. When they need 
to know anything special about Islam or culture there, they just call me and 
ask. I inform them about what they would like to learn … I take part during 
the international visits of police forces from Muslim countries to NYPD and 
Raymond Kelly. This situation surprises visiting delegations because although 
I am originally a civilian I have a role in official circles.6
He stressed his close working relationship with the police commissioner: “Raymond 
Kelly wants me to visit him at least two times a month. Beside community meet-
ings, I join some of the staff meetings with him.” Interestingly, this may hint at 
one of the problems with this type of local initiative, which is that, though they 
constitute positive moves, they may be the brainchild of a single individual – in 
this case New York Police Commissioner Kelly – and thus run the risk of being 
discontinued or sidelined when a new person takes over. This risk was in fact 
directly communicated to me by another NYPD liaison officer posted in the Middle 
East, who expressed the opinion that it was “all Raymond Kelly” behind the liaison 
program. According to at least that one officer, the program would be in jeopardy 
of failing after Kelly left.
In considering complications or shortcomings of the various modes of coopera-
tion within the liberal state and multi- centric realms, it appears that even one of the 
most common methods, the appointing of police liaisons to IOs, has limitations. 
First, it should be noted that there are several ways of appointing liaison offic-
ers (see Figure 7.2), but the two main methods of using liaison officers can be 
categorized as government- to- government (appointing them in a bilateral manner 
between two states) or government- to- international organization (state appoint-
ments of LOs to an international structure). Sending officers to an institutional 
setting such as EUROPOL is an example of the latter, while the former describes 
the traditional bilateral system, in which two countries appoint liaison officers 
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Traditionally, this bilateral kind of liaisonship has been established between the 
central police structures of two countries, though in some cases, bilateral liaison 
officers may be used as accredited liaison officers for other regional countries. As 
yet another pattern, in Scandinavia, a liaison officer from one Nordic country may 
represent all Nordic countries in the host country.
The relative benefits and disadvantages of these two primary forms of liaisonship 
(state- to- state, state- to- IO) are frequently discussed by police officers in the field. 
The general impression based on a series of interviews with active liaison offic-
ers and police managers is that appointments to organizations such as EUROPOL 
may be useful for policy setting, establishing common standards and creating 
Figure 7.2 Methods of liaison officer deployment
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data warehouses, but when it comes to actually solving crimes or following up 
on cases, they can face problems. First, they note that the bureaucratic structure 
of international organizations can be a negative characteristic. A liaison officer 
with experience both at international organizations and in bilateral appointments 
argued that:
Bureaucracy dominates the relationships at international organizations. 
Processing a request at an international organization may take months. On the 
other hand bilateral liaison officers may conclude the same requests in hours 
and even in minutes.7
Similarly, a deputy National Police Commissioner with whom I spoke, argued 
that:
Through our normal [bilaterally appointed] liaison officers, we can get very 
important and urgent information in quite a short time when we need it. 
Otherwise we could have waited for days through other channels. Therefore 
we give special importance in employing liaison officers directly to areas of 
our concern.8
These comparisons and the resulting impression of the inefficiency of LOs at inter-
national organizations raises an interesting point about speed and effectiveness. 
Being together at an international organization like EUROPOL means that LOs 
can be physically gathered together quickly in order to inform them about urgent 
issues, for example, to share among them intelligence that an attack may take place 
somewhere in Europe. On the other hand, if we are to look at the efficiency and 
speed of investigations, there is a general consensus that international organizations 
are not always productive. In the words of one PLO:
International organizations such as EUROPOL and INTERPOL are good for 
coming together, talking on issues, setting agendas and planning the future but 
I do not believe that they help in cases when urgent response is needed.9
The shortcomings of international organizations like INTERPOL or EUROPOL are 
also suggested by the fact that some member states of these international organi-
zations still feel the need to appoint separate, bilateral liaisons in other member 
countries – a practice that should not theoretically be necessary given that their 
officers work alongside each other at the organization. One Deputy National Police 
Commissioner told me that they had been “receiving requests of direct Liaison 
Officer employment by our partners more and more because quite a lot of police 
organizations believe that employing liaison officers is an important way of suc-
ceeding timely and successful cooperation”.10 Yet another liaison officer blamed 
the need for reverting to bilateral practices as being the result of the “impotencies of 
EUROPOL channels”.11 Even information given on INTERPOL’s web page shows 
that member countries such as Austria, Germany, France, the Czech Republic, 
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the Nordic Countries, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Spain all have LO 
posts in these and other European countries, even though they are all members of 
EUROPOL. This situation shows that states still feel the need to establish bilateral 
relations although they are in the same IO and, in fact, there is an ongoing debate 
about the use of EUROPOL. One European police manager interviewed, pointed 
out the organization’s limitations, saying:
Using only EUROPOL channels and the liaison offices at the EUROPOL 
headquarters between member states, and ending the practice of liaison officer 
appointments bilaterally between member states, has been proposed by a few 
countries, but accepting such a proposal seems to be impossible right now.12
The realist/state and multi- centric domains
When we look at the realist/state- centric domain and its role in cooperation prac-
tices, we see that diplomacy has long constituted the main practice of the realist/
state- centric domain for coordinating cooperation on security matters, together 
with other state- related forms of cooperation such as in the judiciary,13 where 
various practices, from extradition, to recognizing foreign penal judgements, to 
cross- border freezing and seizing of assets, all have been and continue to be used 
to counter threats – including increasingly transnational ones. Diplomacy may be 
the most traditional form of building up cooperation on security matters, but when 
it comes in particular to twenty- first century transnational threats, diplomacy and 
the diplomats who conduct it may face critical challenges. There remain, as always, 
the traditional complexities of state- to- state relations, such as states looking out for 
their own national interests, the lack of trust, the drive for survival, and so on, but in 
addition, there may be slowness on the part of these state diplomats to adapt to new 
kinds of threats and to adopt the kinds of transnational responses necessary to face 
them. Diplomats still tend to remain traditionally trained and to hold fundamental 
beliefs in a state- centric and state- dominant world. They may be more likely to 
view the post- 9/11 period as just that – an interim period within a long history of 
state- to- state security domination – rather than a sign of a broader shift. Thus, in 
both vision and in preparedness/training, they are not likely to be quick to adapt 
to new, transnational practices.
Increasingly, however, we see diplomatic efforts being accompanied by other 
statist actors acting in a more transnational manner – in other words, becoming 
what we might call transgovernmental, or, as suggested in this volume, “statist 
transnational” actors. Since these actors establish transnational links beyond the 
strict control of foreign offices or departments of state, their actions may constitute 
moves into the realist/multi- centric domain. These government entities neverthe-
less remain part of the state system. They act on behalf of states, and even when 
they create entities above the borders of states, they may use diplomatic or state 
channels to do so. As for police liaison officers working in a traditional bilateral 
manner, their appointments and official functions remain in the state- centric 
realm (for example, they are often stationed at their countries’ embassies abroad) 
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though, as we will see later on, their actual practices often spread into the realist/
multi- centric domain.
Europe has often led the way in examples of such transnational relations between 
sub- state actors. For decades, various sub- state entities have initiated their own 
transnational cooperative ventures. Such sub- state initiatives have generally been 
established on a regional basis, with an aim to controlling borders. They include, 
for example, the regular meetings of the heads of police from Berlin, Bern, 
Bratislava, Budapest, Munich, Prague and Vienna,14 and the close cooperation 
that has existed since the 1980s in the trinational Upper Rhine Area between Basel 
(Switzerland), Freiburg (Germany) and Mulhouse (France).15 The Netherlands 
have also established Police Partnership Programs (PPP) with Hungary, Poland 
and the Czech Republic, for purposes of exchanging professional knowledge and 
experience, and building up mutual understanding and respect.16 Perhaps the most 
famous example of sub- state actors setting up cooperation practices is that of the 
transnational police cooperation that exists between France and England, for the 
purpose of securing the Channel Tunnel Region.17
Yet another example is the Metropolitan Police of London, which includes 
a Counter- Terrorism Command responsible for undertaking counter- terrorism 
investigations not only in London but throughout the UK and abroad. Although 
the Metropolitan Police is mainly established as an agency for the Metropolitan 
area of London, in this particular structure they also function as a support agency 
for investigations outside of the city. Most importantly, the Counter- Terrorism 
Command of the Metropolitan Police is the “single point of contact for interna-
tional partners in counter- terrorism matters” with an ability to investigate overseas 
attacks against British interests.18
Outside of Europe, perhaps the most interesting case is that of the New York 
Police Department. As mentioned earlier, the NYPD has, on its own initiative, 
sent police liaison officers to a variety of countries, including England, Jordan, 
Singapore, Israel, Canada, France and the Dominican Republic. This case bears 
some rather unique characteristics. The NYPD example shows us that a local entity 
may initiate an international cooperative strategy in the field of counter- terrorism, 
which has traditionally been accepted as a state- level issue (see Nussbaum, this vol-
ume). Also noteworthy is the fact that this strategy of a city sending its own PLOs 
has been established for countering terrorism in the aftermath of the September 
11 attacks, and has a very much local primary aim of protecting the city of New 
York. The interest raised by New York’s counter- terrorism liaisonship strategy is 
very much evident, particularly when we consider that other cities have expressed 
interest in copying this practice, including the police departments of Los Angeles, 
Miami, Las Vegas and Chicago.19 For cost- efficiency purposes, it has even been 
proposed that some of these local police departments come together to establish 
such an overseas liaison system.20
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Liaison officers as masters of informal cooperation practices
As was suggested above, although the police liaison system is established within 
the realist/state- centric domain, in one interesting, overall sense, it is possible to 
argue that its usage has been extending into the realist/multi- centric realm. That 
is, while police liaisonship preserves its formally established and thus state- based 
nature, it is functioning informally in several ways. Formal cooperation, it should 
first be noted, takes place within the bureaucratic circles of the relationship. Mutual 
agreements, conventions and all other relevant legal documents shape the formal 
functioning of the relationship, and the rules for these formal relationships have 
long been established. Informally, however, a liaison officer spends his time with 
his colleagues in the host country, often hosted by and given an office in the local 
police department. Consequently, a liaison officer’s time is devoted to establishing 
cooperation and interaction with his counterparts in the name of his organization. In 
the process of working on requests or cases, liaison officers are able to learn more 
extensive and more detailed information. Consequently, the liaison officer learns 
the story of the cases. If there is any procedural problem in sharing the knowledge, 
informal ways of overcoming those difficulties can be discussed. S/he can learn 
about the local details and intricacies of the cases in questions, on site, and work 
more easily to find a solution.
The informal relationships that develop enable LOs to positively contribute 
to formal procedures by establishing a degree of cordiality, friendship and trust 
between parties. Informality also helps smooth over some of the bureaucratic 
processes that may slow down the investigation process. For example, formal rela-
tionships take place within the boundaries of official procedures in a mechanistic 
manner such as the institutional channels and communication of police coopera-
tion. These official procedures may require notifying higher- level administrators 
for permission, using official written forms to request information or permission, 
even using particular formal language when requesting or sending messages. In 
order to set up and conduct contacts between countries, there may be require-
ments to copy these messages to other state- related departments, from the Interior 
Ministry to the Foreign Ministry or even the Prime Minister’s Office. Not only 
might these formalities slow down the process of information exchange and coop-
eration, but may also slow down individuals’ willingness to share information, as 
they might be intimidated by the necessity to write formal requests that anyone 
can later refer back to. Experiences reported by various LOs also revealed that the 
frustrations involved with such procedures are exacerbated because of the nature 
of investigative communications which often require extensive follow- up, back 
and forth, and exchange of ideas – all of which can take considerable time when 
going through formal channels.
On the other hand, informal cooperation eases up the process of communication 
about particular cases and developments within them. During informal communica-
tion with counterparts, police liaison officers share their experiences. During those 
information exchanges both parties give each other information about what is going 
on in cases, what kind of developments they are seeing in criminal strategies and 
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are able to share ideas about specific problems. Sharing information in this way 
gives both parties understanding about current and emerging trends. In that way 
parties build up common understandings about current problems and threats. An 
important example of how this may work was pointed out by a police officer at the 
NATO conference that produced this volume:
After an explosion took place, we have found that the perpetrator had lived 
in a European Country before. We asked the LO of this country information 
about this person and we got all the information. However we could not have 
gotten the same information via letters of rogatory from the judicial authorities 
of the same country.21
This example shows how the informal practices enabled by the liaison system may 
be beneficial in urgent cases.
Such information, gathered quickly in informal communication, is also more 
likely to be able to be used for preventive policing and for establishing preventive 
strategies, especially in countering terrorism. Learning about threats that others are 
experiencing may lead the way to taking necessary steps to avoid similar threats 
in one’s own country. As terrorism is global today, a terrorist method used in one 
country may spread all over the world in just a few days, thus learning more about 
a terrorist method both promptly and in detail may be an invaluable asset for pre-
 emption of an attack in another country.
The importance of informality as a facilitator
It is clear from the above that a key underlying factor that runs throughout the 
developments within police cooperation in general is informality. Simply put, 
informal interaction implies daily contact between actual police officers. Not only 
is this perhaps the unspoken rationale behind setting up formal institutions or 
organizations for cooperation, but in practice, it is informal interaction that makes 
these institutions work and tends to spur unconventional developments of a more 
transnational nature.
The importance of informal interaction is evident in the fact that a definition is 
featured on the web page of the police department in Kent, England, a county which 
is a gateway from England to Europe both via the Channel Tunnel and several 
ports. It serves therefore as an important police authority to establish cooperation 
with international partners. Although this definition is established to describe the 
cooperative structure between the Kent Police and its international partners, it can 
guide our understanding of what informal cooperation entails:
[informal refers to the] natural consequence of day to day contact through 
meetings, visits, telephone conversations, use of LinguaNet system, e.g. infor-
mation required/given on a police to police basis by the spoken word or simple 
documentation. Such information would only be used for police purposes and 
cannot be used in judicial proceedings. The use of the information can, by 
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negotiation, be upgraded to the levels and associated procedures of formal or 
FORMAL information.22
Informal cooperation gives several advantages to police organizations. First of 
all, informal cooperation makes communication between parties faster and easier. 
As the above definition notes, it may also be possible for cooperation to include 
the use of a shared computer system. Any questions can be directly forwarded to 
partners to discuss on the issue. Based on those discussions, the parties may decide 
to take steps to establish formal procedures. Secondly, informal cooperation may 
help to increase trust and reliability between parties. As informal cooperation 
relies on day- to- day interaction, it helps parties to learn and trust each other. The 
higher the level of trust, informal cooperation may be more productive. Informal 
cooperation allows for sharing of stories about crimes and partners, and thus for 
learning about trends.
An equally critical factor allowing police cooperation to work as an essential 
tool between police organizations is the presence of a shared identity of “police 
culture”. Police culture allows police officers to understand problems in the same 
way. As one liaison officer put it:
Although the country that I work in has diplomatic tensions with mine, I never 
feel those tensions with my police counterparts, because as police officers we 
look at crime and criminals, including terrorism, in the same way.23
In essence, this officer is describing what Deflem formulates conceptually as, “the 
objective of counter- terror policing is de- politicization of terrorism and seeing 
terrorism as a crime”.24 This point reflects the identity of police in evaluating ter-
rorism: when seeing terrorism as just another crime, cooperation becomes easier.
Police liaison officers: masters of the frontier
The first half of this chapter has shown that across different domains of state and 
multi- centric activity, attempts are being made and initiatives introduced to “tran-
snationalize” the response to transnational security threats. Whether it is the spread 
of sub- state or non- state actors into realms previously limited to state actors, or the 
increasingly informal use of formal state actors or processes, there is no doubt that 
a changing nature of security threats has bred changes among those responsible 
for responding to those threats. At the forefront of the most effective changes we 
find the police, and, in particular, we can see evidence of innovative uses of police 
liaisons. Who are these pioneers of informal transnational security cooperation and 
what trends do we see in their deployment and nature?
Actors of the states’ transnationalization: who are the PLOs?
The following definition of liaison officers by the European Council reflects the 
general characteristics of the term “liaison officer”:
Police liaisons as builders of transnational security cooperation 135
“liaison officer” means a representative of one of the Member States, posted 
abroad by a law enforcement agency to one or more third countries or to inter-
national organisations to establish and maintain contacts with the authorities 
in those countries or organisations with a view to contributing to preventing 
or investigating criminal offences.25
Research on the police liaison system in Europe has described the characteris-
tics of police liaison officers as being on the margins of the police world, often 
multilingual, having some form of advanced education, being “urbane” and “cos-
mopolitan” and recognizing each other as belonging to the same small elitist and 
political world.26 According to the same study, they see their position as a form of 
promotion with financial and symbolic benefits, and note their job’s emphasis on 
strategic analysis requiring analytical skills and the ability to make comparisons 
between states.
Liaison officers have also been described more cynically in the limited literature 
about them:
The second model is that of the liaison, in the dual role of formal representative 
and informal “fixer”. Like the assorted representatives of the many non- law 
enforcement agencies that increasingly crowd U.S. embassies, few of whom 
engage in detective- like activities, U.S. law enforcement agents stationed 
abroad are expected to act both as official representatives of their agencies 
and as “fixers” for the assorted requests and problems that come their way. 
U.S. agents abroad often find their days crowded with fielding inquiries from 
U.S. based agents, transmitting requests for information and other assistance 
between local police agencies, serving as hosts for fellow agents flown in 
on specific investigations, arranging reservations and programs for visiting 
politicians, and high level officials, dealing with the media, giving speeches, 
and attending assorted social functions.27
The somewhat unenthusiastic nature of this definition of the LOs’ duties and the 
image of the LOs as existing on some line between a real police officer and a 
diplomat, perhaps naturally leads to tensions at times between the LOs and the 
diplomatic corps. Relations between police liaison officers and diplomats tend to 
fall into two main categories: one in which there is little or no interaction between 
the two groups; or a second in which they have frequent contact. The first case is 
what happens when LOs are serving at international organizations or appointed in 
border areas where they travel daily between the countries. The second scenario is 
the general case in a bilateral appointment, when the LOs serve in their embassy 
abroad, and function there as part of the diplomatic mission.
Among the latter cases it is possible to see even greater distinctions between 
types. In some cases, such as in that of the USA, the country aims to establish 
police liaisonship as an important part of the diplomatic relationship. US govern-
ment institutions are increasingly involved in international police matters because 
the US government views the international crime problem as a “component of 
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foreign policy and national security, not just as a law enforcement issue,”28 and 
police assistance is seen as part of the foreign policy of the US.29 On the other 
hand, in countries that do not have well established liaisonship programs, there are 
more likely to be problems and tensions arising between LOs and the diplomats 
they serve alongside. One liaison officer from a European country described his 
relationship with the diplomatic mission as follows: “My Ambassador asked me 
quite a lot of times what I am doing as a liaison officer. And he still wonders why 
our country needs me.”30 The liaison officer of another country complained about 
his Ambassador, saying that he “did not want to give me a room at the Embassy. 
He doesn’t see my work necessary”.31
The complexities and potential contradictions noted in the earlier quote and 
in the above description of the relations between LOs and diplomats, all seem to 
reflect the “hybrid” nature of police liaisons – they are between roles, between 
duties. But this does not have to be a negative quality. This hybrid character might 
be quite uniquely positive, particularly with respect to their formality/informal-
ity. They have formal legitimacy, but informal capacity; they are formal in terms 
of the passports they carry, but informal in their actions. It is this bridging of 
the formal/informal gap in particular that makes them successful pioneers of the 
transition from the international, state- centric realm, into the transnational, multi-
 centric one.
What is also interesting about police liaison officers, is that they are not a new 
phenomenon. The appointing of police liaison officers as a practice goes back to the 
late nineteenth century when the world witnessed several decades of Anarchist and 
revolutionary violence. Writing about the mid- 1800s, Deflem argues that the Police 
Union of German States appointed a German police officer at the German embassy 
in London and other agents were placed in Paris, London, Brussels, and New 
York.32 It has also been noted that during the same era the Russians established a 
special bureau in Paris, and other cooperative initiatives in Berlin and several other 
European cities, with an aim to police revolutionary activity organizing abroad 
against the Russian Empire.33 Even the US Marshals Service, which was founded 
in 1789, has had among its aims the establishing of international cooperation, while 
US customs involved sending or stationing agents abroad.34
In the early decades of the twentieth century, liaison posts emerged in response 
to the communist threat, for example, Switzerland allowed French, British 
and American agents to serve in embassies in Bern to “observe the commu-
nist presence.”35 But it was really in the 1970s that the use of liaison officers 
increased dramatically, and this was due to drug- related issues. The United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
of 1988 encouraged the usage of liaison officers. In Paragraph 1- e of Article 9 of 
this Convention, member parties are urged to “Facilitate effective co- ordination 
between their competent agencies and services and promote the exchange of 
personnel and other experts, including the posting of liaison officers.”36 In fact, 
due to the focus on drugs, police liaison officers were for a long time referred to, 
particularly in Europe, as drug liaison officers. This situation began to change in 
the 1990s with the spread of cross- border terrorism, and the subsequent gradual 
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growth in states permitting the involvement of police liaison officers with terrorism 
cases. It has even been argued that today’s global counter- terrorism campaign is 
built on previous policing efforts against drugs.37
Looking at things historically, we can say that police liaison officers have been 
used flexibly by states. Introduced during the Anarchist era to counter cross- border 
political concerns, liaison officers later became important for their use in inter-
national drug enforcement. Now, with terrorism having taken on a transnational 
nature, we are observing the increasing importance and employment of liaison 
officers to counter this threat.
Growth of bilateral PLOs
If police liaisonships of various types are evolving in the fight against terrorism, 
are they also growing in number? How many actual police cooperation agree-
ments have been signed, and how many police liaison officers have actually been 
appointed in the more traditional bilateral manner? These are seemingly simple 
questions, but surprisingly difficult to answer. The data that do exist are difficult to 
keep up to date because of the flexibility states have in appointing liaison officers. 
States appoint LOs based on their immediate needs, and as soon as that specific 
need is gone, the states may quickly decide to draw the liaison officer back. Even 
more problematic though, is that such data simply are not easily found in public 
documents. International organizations do not always provide information on the 
numbers of agreements and liaison officers. INTERPOL provides the names of the 
member countries on its web page, but country- specific information can be found 
only on the European Police and Judicial Systems page, and there only 21 of the 
186 member countries provide detailed information about their police and judicial 
system – including numbers of liaison posts.38
A more direct effort to collect such information helps flesh out the picture a bit 
more. The information provided in the following section was collected both by 
directly contacting national police organizations via their e- mail addresses, and 
by conducting internet searches for “police cooperation agreements” and “police 
liaison officer” and examining the resulting news reports, reports of international 
organizations, and web pages of police/law enforcement organizations. Also taken 
into consideration were the web pages of national police organizations of vari-
ous countries’ interior ministries. These latter web pages provided complete and 
accurate numbers, but not many countries have them. Numbers from international 
organizations or news reports are more easily found, but are less likely to be 
accurate because the facts change quickly. Directly contacting the national police 
organizations was the best way to get the most accurate and up- to- date information, 
but as a method it also had some practical complications. The primary problem 
was that of the 145 countries whose police organizations or relevant ministries’ 
e- mail addresses were found and to whom e- mails were sent requesting informa-
tion, 40 bounced back as failed delivery.
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Numbers of PLOs worldwide
To understand how extensive the use of PLOs is worldwide, we can look at the 
numbers of PLOs actually posted. Based on the various searches used for this study, 
54 countries were found to deploy police liaison officers to around 650 different 
sites, with 13 countries found to send liaison officers to more than 10 different 
sites. The number of those sites does not necessarily reflect the total number of 
actual officers posted, however, since more than one officer may be appointed 
to a single liaison office. There is also no clear correlation between the sites for 
posting and the number of countries covered by those posts, since some liaison 
offices may cover an area greater than a single country. In other words, an office 
established in one country may be responsible for other countries in the same 
region. For example, the FBI legal attaché office in Nigeria is also responsible for 
Ghana, Togo, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome’ and Principe, and Cameroon. 
Yet another example, the FBI has liaison offices in 60 countries around the world, 
but it covers a far greater number because each liaison post is responsible for more 
than one country.
In general, the numbers noted here are almost certainly underestimates the total 
number of PLOs stationed around the world currently. Direct contact with national 
police organizations revealed more liaison agreements and postings than those 
revealed by the internet search. For example, no information about Lebanese police 
agreements was available on the internet, but an e- mail from Lebanese authorities 
showed that they actually have bilateral police cooperation agreements with four 
other countries, and while the internet search showed only four LOs stationed in 
Lebanon, the e- mail response attested to a total of 15. Similarly, the internet search 
found just eight Slovak LOs posted abroad, one foreign LO in Slovakia, and a total 
of eight police agreements between Slovakia and other countries. Direct reporting 
by the Slovakian authorities revealed, however, a total of 10 Slovak LOs abroad, 
six foreign LOs in Slovakia, nine foreign LOs in third countries with agreements 
to work on behalf of Slovakia, and 26 police agreements with other countries. With 
respect to future numbers, the e- mail replies also point to intentions to increase 
the numbers of LOs currently posted. Polish authorities predict increases from 
current numbers of 7–10 LOs to about 15 in the next few years, and Slovakia also 
reported intentions to open up two additional LO posts in the coming year. During 
my research, I have also observed that other countries expressed the desire to 
create more posts, but pointed to budgetary or political restraints preventing this 
expansion.
Overall, the USA seems to have the lead in appointing liaison officers. This is in 
part because the USA has more than one agency appointing officers, each with a 
different focus. These include the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the FBI, the 
Department of Homeland Security, the State Department, and the Department of 
Immigration and Naturalization. Among these, the DEA and the FBI are the most 
well known ones in terms of using liaison officers. The DEA has offices in 62 coun-
tries around the world, while the FBI, responsible for serious crimes and terrorism, 
has offices in 60 countries. With such numbers, both organizations clearly have 
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already a global reach, but in fact the numbers of American liaison posts is on the 
rise. Looking specifically at the FBI, in 1992 there were only 16 offices worldwide, 
but due to increasing international terrorism39 this had grown to 44 in June 2001, 
when then FBI Director Louis Freeh left the office, and to 57 after 9/11.40 Former 
FBI director Louis Freeh testified in post- 9/11 hearings that “the FBI needed to 
significantly increase its international role and liaison with our foreign law enforce-
ment and security counterparts”41 and in reference to the 1996 Khobar bombings, 
stated that he would have done much better if he had “had an FBI agent in Riyadh 
on June 25th, 1996, when that tragedy occurred, who had the trust and the relation-
ship that the legate had three years later when he set up the office.”42
Though perhaps not quite with the worldwide reach of the Americans, the liaison 
system is also an important aspect of policing in Europe, both internally between 
European countries and also externally in establishing relations with other coun-
tries. There is of course EUROPOL, a structure based on liaison understanding, 
in which member countries appoint liaison officers for the purpose of establish-
ing police cooperation between each other. Bilateral police liaisonships between 
European countries also continue, with Britain, Germany and France taking the 
leading roles in appointment of bilateral liaison posts.
Another region where the importance of police liaisonships against terrorism is 
increasingly being recognized is Oceania, particularly after 9/11 and the attacks 
in Bali. The web page of the New Zealand Police announces that establishing 
new liaison posts is seen as an important step in increasing capability to pre- empt 
and respond to terrorist attacks,43 and the Acting Deputy Commissioner of the 
New Zealand Police has said publicly that “International co- operation is vital in 
responding to terrorist attacks” and that therefore their liaison officer network has 
been expanding since 2001.44 The international network of Australian LOs gives 
them reach into virtually every corner of the globe,45 and has been compared in its 
vastness to that of the USA, with references to the “new regional policeman”.46 In 
Asia, the ASEAN countries have several efforts focused on improving cooperation 
on crimes, particularly terrorism, and the exchange of LOs is becoming an impor-
tant component of this cooperation. The 5th ASEAN ministerial meeting in 2005 
focused on the establishment of police liaison officers in the member countries.47 
Korea and Japan also contribute to cooperative efforts in the region, and a Xinhua 
News Agency report in 2004 notes China’s calls for closer cooperation and for 
greater exchange of LOs.48
The results of this inquiry into the growth of police liaisons reflects at least two 
important issues. First, while the numbers are on the rise, still, only about a quarter 
of all countries are able to send LOs to other countries, and only a quarter of those 
countries have managed to establish liaison posts widely – i.e. in more than ten 
countries. The USA, France, Britain, Germany, Spain, Italy, Canada, and Australia 
can be accepted as the leading countries in appointing LOs, and so we can safely 
say that this is a method used predominantly by western states and by those that 
are economically strong.
Second, it is important to consider the sensitive nature of establishing police 
agreements and LOs. While sending out e- mail requests for information on LOs, 
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the responses were not always positive. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, for 
example, replied only that police cooperation agreements are classified and that it 
was therefore not possible to release these numbers publicly. Similar replies were 
also received from Italy and the Czech Republic. Some other countries however, 
went out of their way to provide up- to- date and accurate information. What is 
interesting about this is the varying degrees of sensitivity with which different 
countries treat the issue of sharing this information. While some states openly 
place this information on their web pages, others refuse to make the information 
public for any reason.
This fact in itself indicates the gray area in which this type of cooperation takes 
place. It is not necessarily seen as part of the traditional, completely secretive 
national security way of thinking, but it is not completely open either. It thus has 
clearly the potential to be invaded by a national security mentality. If this happens, 
police liaisons will become a part of international practices, with their age- old limi-
tations for cooperation, such as mistrust. If it can remain a less nationalized, more 
transnationalized practice, it will remain a powerful potential for cooperation.
Conclusion
Reflecting the arguments in Chapter 1, this chapter looked in concrete terms at 
the widening gap between the nature of terrorist activity and the response to this 
terrorist threat. The widening of this gap has accelerated since the end of the Cold 
War, as terrorism has become an increasingly transnational phenomenon while the 
response has remained largely at the international level.
Recent efforts of police organizations show, however, that as one of the key 
actors in fighting against terrorism, they are trying to find ways of closing this 
gap. Police forces are establishing transnational networks, the most significant 
example of which is in the deployment of liaison officers. The increasingly infor-
mal behaviors of formally appointed liaison officers can be viewed as an example 
of statist- transnational relations, which is a significant sign of a move into a more 
post- international era. It is via the police liaison officers that states are showing 
they have the capacity to go transnational in response to the transnational threat 
of terrorism. They represent, therefore, a revolutionary change and a sign of states 
adapting into the transnational world.
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